Introduction
In this article, I want to explore the relationship between democracy and justice. Since no-one worth talking to is in favour of authoritarianism and injustice, I shall assume that everyone values both these political goods.
2
Everyone thinks that the people should rule, and that all should get their due.
Given the plausibility of this assumption, as well as the importance of democracy and justice, it seems odd that political philosophers have not given more attention to the relationship between these two goods. Some have concentrated on justice. For them, the primary task is to specify a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. How a political association may effect such a just distribution is not their (primary) concern.
Others have concentrated on democracy. For them, the fundamental issue is to determine the proper nature and extent of collective self-rule. Focusing on the specification of fair decision-making procedures, these philosophers generally forswear detailed accounts of justice since they believe that it is for citizens themselves to decide what is just. It is only over the last several years that a number of political philosophers have tried to articulate and justify detailed accounts of the relationship between these two political goods.
1 My aim in this article is to contribute to this small but growing literature by formulating my own account of the relationship between democracy and justice. I shall argue that they stand in a circular relationship: while one requirement of justice is that political arrangements are democratic, it is only in democratic deliberation that the nature of justice can be established.
I develop my own position by engaging in a critical dialogue with Nancy
Fraser. While best known for her attempts to combine cultural recognition and economic redistribution, 2 Fraser has recently added a third element of political representation to her account, which she now calls a theory of "democratic justice". 3 Thus she argues that "justice as participatory parity" has 3 three distinct and mutually irreducible dimensions -cultural, economic and political. With regard to her account specifically of the relationship between democracy and justice, Fraser suggests that they are internally connected, mutually entwined or co-implicated. 4 I think the essence of this account is right. It is for the citizens in a democracy to decide which claims for recognition, redistribution and representation are just; but this is only possible if inclusive deliberation is underpinned by just recognition, redistribution and representation. Having said this, I also think that Fraser"s account of democratic justice falls seriously short since it fails to show how it is possible to avoid the dangers of vicious circles. It is not always the case that more justice leads to more democracy, and more democracy to more justice, until democratic justice is fully achieved. In fact, it is quite possible for circles to be vicious rather than virtuous, so that unfair democratic procedures help to reproduce a state of injustice, and such a state of injustice helps to perpetuate unfair democratic procedures. My suggestion will be that by understanding the reasons for Fraser"s failure to deal with this problem of vicious circles, it will be possible to appreciate what an adequate account of democratic justice would be like.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 is mainly exegetical, presenting Fraser"s own theory. Section 3 focuses on a problem which must be faced by any circular account of democratic justice. Showing how circles can be vicious as well as virtuous, I argue that Fraser fails to provide a satisfactory solution to this problem. To be specific, I critically analyse and reject her claim that if two particular preconditions -the "capacity for 4 reflexivity" and "counter-public spheres" -are in place, it will be possible to avoid vicious circles. Section 4 builds on this critique in order to go beyond
Fraser"s theory. I begin by arguing that although democracy and justice do form a circular relationship, it is essential to give latter greater weight than the former. Then I finesse my account by seeking to identify those conditions of justice which should enjoy greater weighting. Section 5 summarizes the results of my investigations, sketching the principal features of an account of democratic justice which is significantly different from and a marked improvement on that of Fraser.
Democratic justice
In this section, I explain why Fraser thinks that there are "deep internal connections between democracy and justice". 5 First, I show why she rejects two alternative accounts of the relationship between these goods. Next, I
demonstrate the importance of the principle of participatory parity for her own account. Finally, I examine her claim that democracy and justice stand in a circular relationship to one another.
In developing her account of democratic justice, Fraser rejects two alternatives. On the one hand, she discards what she calls a "monological" or even "Platonic" account, according to which "latter day philosopher kings" draw up detailed blueprints of the requirements of justice. Such an account, in giving no role to democracy, is "insensitive to issues of context", overlooks "the fact of pluralism", and "neglects the importance of democratic legitimacy". 6 To 5 focus on this final criticism, the principle of democracy holds that in order to be bound by a law, its addresses must be able to regard themselves as its authors, and this means that it must be the outcome of democratic deliberation. 7 Since it gives no role to democracy, a monological account of justice fails to show that the laws it favours are legitimate. On the other hand,
Fraser also rejects an "empty proceduralism" which, by jettisoning "substantive content", is guilty of "self-effacing vacuity". 8 That is to say, an account of democracy which reduces it to a set of formal procedures fails to provide practical guidance in questions of justice. Rejecting both of these options,
Fraser attempts to articulate an account of the relationship between democracy and justice which give both the importance they deserve, and which places them in the correct relationship to one another.
To see how she attempts to do this, It is necessary to appreciate the key role that the principle of "parity of participation" plays in Fraser"s theory.
According to this principle, "justice requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life". By making it possible clearly to specify the necessary conditions of parity in all particular circumstances, Fraser believes that this principle can provide concrete guidance in matters of practical justice. It can do so by identifying the obstacles which need to be removed if parity is to be achieved. As she puts it: "Overcoming injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction". 9 The parity principle is the lynchpin of Fraser"s theory since, as we shall see, it both unifies her three dimensions of justice, and helps to provide the link between 6 her conceptions of justice and democracy. The best way to explain how it can do all of this is to show why it can be regarded as both an "outcome notion"
and a "process notion".
10
As an outcome notion, parity of participation serves as a standard that social arrangements must meet if they are to be regarded as just. In this regard, it is important to appreciate that justice has three distinct and mutually irreducible dimensions. The first, economic dimension of "redistribution" corresponds to what Fraser calls the "economic structure" or, less frequently, the "class structure" of society. In this dimension, "people can be impeded from full participation by economic structures that deny them the resources they need in order to interact with others as peers". The second, cultural dimension of "recognition" corresponds to what she most often calls the "status order" of society. In this dimension, "people can … be prevented from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing". The third, political dimension of "representation" corresponds to what Fraser calls the "political constitution of society". In this dimension, the injustice of misrepresentation "occurs when political boundaries and/or decision rules function to deny some people, wrongly, the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction -including, but not only, in political arenas". 11 Fraser"s account brings these three dimensions together by contending that in all of them justice is to be understood as parity of participation.
7
With reference to the third dimension of justice, it is important to understand that Fraser distinguishes two distinct levels of politics. "First-order" or "ordinary-political" justice concerns "the constitution of … the decision rules by which [the state] structures contestation". She calls this the level of "intraframe representation" since the character of the frame itself is not called into question. 13 In other words, the current boundaries of the political community are taken for granted. At this first level, justice is achieved when the decision rules of that community are formulated so that its members enjoy equal voice.
In particular circumstances, this might entail measures such as proportional electoral systems, gender quotas and multicultural rights. "Second-order" or "meta-level" justice concerns "the nature of the state"s jurisdiction". This is the level at which what Fraser call "the politics of framing" takes place.
14 Here the identity of frame itself is subject to scrutiny as the fairness of the prevailing boundaries are challenged. At this level, justice requires that political boundaries are drawn in such a way that individuals who are significantly affected by political decisions are members of the deliberative community which has the opportunity to shape those decisions. Once the dual character of participatory parity as both outcome and process notion is taken into account, "the circularity of the relations between justice and democracy" 18 becomes clear. As Fraser puts it, On the one hand, what exactly is needed to achieve parity of participation in a given case can only be determined dialogically, through fair democratic deliberation. On the other hand, fair democratic deliberation presupposes that participatory parity already exists. 19 Regarded as a process notion, participatory parity supplies us with a standard by which we can judge the legitimacy of norms. Just norms are those which emerge from fairly constituted democratic procedures. Regarded as an outcome notion, however, participatory parity supplies us with a standard of 9 justice by which we can evaluate current social arrangements. So far as the political constitution of society goes, justice requires that such arrangements are democratic. Keeping both of these notions in focus at the same time, we can say that while democratic deliberation determines justice, justice is necessary to ensure that such deliberation is fair. My argument will be that each as it stands is inadequate, and that even both together are not sufficient to escape vicious circles.
(a) vicious circles
There is no doubt that in many cases the conditions needed for a virtuous circle to exist do hold, so that democracy and justice do support one another.
Yet there are also plenty of cases in which such fortuitous conditions are not present. There can be circumstances in which less than fully inclusive deliberation leads to less than fully just outcomes, and less than fully just outcomes undermine the possibility of fully inclusive deliberation. In these circumstances, since injustice and a lack of democracy reinforce one another, there may be no possibility of movement toward the complete realization of democratic justice. It could be argued, furthermore, that in practice circles of democratic justice are rather more likely to be vicious than virtuous. As Iris Marion Young puts it: "In actually existing democracies there tends to be a reinforcing circle between social and economic inequality and political inequality that enables the powerful to use formally democratic processes to perpetuate injustice or preserve privilege". 22 To put this argument in Fraser"s terms, those who possess the resources, status and voice necessary to enjoy parity are in a position to ensure that the outcomes of democratic deliberation are to their own benefit. Thus there can be a circular relationship between justice and democracy in which obstacles to first-order justice and a deficiency in democratic procedures reinforce one another.
Fraser herself acknowledges the possibility that the relationship between democracy and justice may take the form of a vicious rather than virtuous circle:
Those who suffer from misrepresentation are vulnerable to injustices of status and class. Lacking political voice, they are unable to articulate and defend their interests with respect to distribution and recognition, which in turn exacerbates their misrepresentation. In such cases, the 11 result is a vicious circle in which the three orders of injustice reinforce one another, denying some people the chance to participate on a par with others in social life. 23 Since the poor and despised are unable to play an effective part in democratic deliberation, the outcomes of such deliberation are likely to be skewed against them. Unable to participate on a par with others, these disadvantaged insiders are unable successfully to demand the reforms which would make democratic deliberation an effective vehicle for the achievement of justice.
Here Fraser focuses on those I have called disadvantaged insiders, but the same analysis can be extended to excluded outsiders as well. 24 In this case, "anyone who is structurally excluded from participation in social interaction is eo ipso denied the possibility of participating as a peer". 25 Since these outsiders lack even formal membership of the political community, they have no chance at all of participating in its deliberations.
(b) "the capacity for reflexivity"
In order to see how Fraser thinks that a viciously circular relationship between a shortfall in democracy and deficiency of justice can be broken, it will be instructive to consider her reply to a question put to her by Kate Nash in a recent interview: "how can the political community of the all affected, as you put it, be formed out of the political community which is not already that of those who are all affected?" 26 In other words, how can the boundaries of the political community be expanded to include those outsiders who are significantly affected by the actions of that community? (The corresponding question concerning first-order politics would be: how can a political community in which all have equal voice be formed out of a community in which at present not all members have equal voice?) In her reply, Fraser argues that one precondition necessary in order to determine the boundaries of a political community democratically is "conceptual". However, since I
cannot see in what sense this precondition is "conceptual", I shall refer to it instead, using Fraser"s own terminology, as "the capacity for reflexivity". 27 The capacity for reflexivity, which is a feature of all human practices, is the ability of participants to take a metaphorical step back from a particular practice in order to subject it to critical examination. At the ordinary-political level, members of a political association engage in the practice of "raising (first-order) claims for redistribution and recognition". 28 That is to say, they collectively deliberate about whether the distribution of resources is fair, whether the recognition of status is appropriate -and, I would add, whether the current mode of ordinary-political representation is justified. As a result of such first-order deliberation, reforms may be made which extend parity to currently marginalized members of the political association. In particular circumstances, however, such a debate about justice may also lead members of that association to reflect at the meta-level on the fairness of the debate itself. It is at this point that the capacity for reflexivity is exercised. This capacity enables us to "take first-order politics as the object of our reflection …
The result is a form of meta-politics in which the exclusions of ordinary political practices are exposed and contested". 29 In other words, members of 13 a political association may ask whether existing political boundaries are fair, and they may then decide to reform those boundaries if they are adjudged to be obstacles to the achievement of parity.
Thus Fraser"s argument is that it is possible to break out of vicious circles of undemocratic injustice if critical reflection on the fairness of current political arrangements leads to reforms which move the political association closer to parity of participation. I want to argue that as it stands, and certainly not on its own, the capacity for reflexivity cannot provide a means of breaking out of vicious circles of undemocratic injustice. To begin with, it should be noted that this precondition gives the responsibility to act to those members of a political association who are already included and enjoy effective voice.
Insiders with the necessary resources, status and voice have the capacity for reflexivity, and, if they exercise it, it may be possible for them to move that association closer to the achievement of parity. It is, however, important to note the conditionality and modality of this proposition. If members of a political association choose to exercise their capacity for reflexivity, they may be able to move that association closer to the achievement of parity of participation. It is important to understand that there is no guarantee that this will happen. In order to see why not, I now want to identify three conditions which must be in place if the capacity of reflexivity is to be capable of helping a political association escape vicious circles of undemocratic injustice.
First, members of a political association must have the motivation to exercise their capacity for reflexivity. Why would the politically powerful have 14 reason to change current political arrangements in a way that would reduce their power? Why, for example, would a group that currently benefits from a majoritarian voting system be motivated to switch to a more proportional system in which they would lose a degree of power? In response to this question, Fraser might reply that if parity of participation is the "preferred language for conducting democratic political argumentation", 30 then members of the association will be willing to accept the normative case for the reform of the current electoral system. But this response would beg the question. If parity is not already the "preferred language", then the normative case will not be accepted. In this regard, it is worth quoting Fraser"s comment that "the circularity problem arises for any approach that envisions a transition to more just social arrangements via political processes that occur by definition in unjust circumstances". 31 To suppose that insiders will be motivated to exercise their capacity for reflexivity in pursuance of justice as participatory parity is to assume that in this regard at least circumstances are not unjust.
This, I suggest, is simply to wish the problem away. In conjunction, these three conditions are highly demanding. Taken together, they suggest that even if members of a political association do have the capacity for reflexivity, they may not be able or willing to exercise it in the name of democratic justice. Without the right motivation, correct information and adequate means, those insiders with effective political voice may fail to take the actions necessary to enable the voiceless and excluded to escape the vicious circle in which they find themselves. My conclusion is that while
Fraser"s invocation of the capacity for reflexivity does identify one means by which vicious circles may be escaped, it offers no guarantees. Indeed, at worst it looks like an exercise in wishful thinking, declaring that there will not be a vicious circle if such a circle does not exist.
(c) "counter-public spheres"
As I have said, in response to Nash"s question about how it is possible for the boundaries of a political community to be expanded in order to include significantly affected outsiders, Fraser identifies two preconditions. She calls the second of these the "institutional precondition". However, since it is not clear to me in what sense this precondition is "institutional", I shall refer to it, using Fraser"s own terminology, under the heading of "counter-public spheres". 34 In order to be able to assess Fraser"s argument, it is important first of all to understand exactly what she means by the notion of counter-public spheres. Here is her gloss on Jürgen Habermas" conception of the public sphere simpliciter:
It designates a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction. This arena is conceptually distinct from the state [and] from the official-economy. 35 In her recent work, she has extended this analysis by drawing a distinction between "mainstream public spheres" and "subaltern counter-publics". 36 Her suggestion is that, since what she calls "a society"s authorized "means of interpretation and communication"" operate to the advantage of privileged groups, they can articulate their views and interests effectively in "mainstream public spheres". By contrast, since those same dominant means of interpretation and communication work to the disadvantage of marginalized and excluded groups, they have had to create their own "subaltern counterpublics" in order newly to name the injustices from which they suffer. Fraser regards second-wave feminists" development and promulgation of concepts such as "date rape" and "sexual harassment" as exemplary in this regard. 37 It is now possible to understand what role Fraser thinks that counterpublic spheres can play in escaping vicious circles of undemocratic injustice.
Here it is necessary to refer to the transnational aspect of her account of democratic justice. Fraser begins by noting a growing gap between "civil society processes of contestation and state-centred processes of legislation and administration". According to the "Westphalian vision", there should be a close correspondence between these two processes, so that a national public articulates its collective opinions in a well-functioning public sphere, and those opinions then exert an appropriate and effective influence over the actions of the state. 38 However, in our increasingly post-Westphalian world, a gap 18 between transnational publics and Westphalian states is opening up.
According to Fraser, this creates the possibility that "non-state centred public spheres [will] become spaces for contesting state-centred frames". Her claim is this: "It is precisely from such post-Westphalian public spheres, which trespass the boundaries of territorial states, that claims against misframing are now being launched". 39 In other words, the most effective critiques of the injustice of existing nation-state boundaries are currently coming from publics whose membership transcend such boundaries. 
Beyond Fraser
I have argued that Fraser does not offer a convincing account of how it is possible to escape from a situation in which a lack of democracy and an absence of justice reinforce one another. Since I still want to defend a circular conception of the relationship between democracy and justice, I need to offer an account of democratic justice capable of showing how vicious circles can be escaped. In this section, therefore, I move beyond Fraser"s account in two major steps. First, in sub-section (a), a critique of her account of "the requirements of justice" 44 leads me to the conclusion that it is necessary to give (certain aspects of) justice more weight than democracy in the relationship between the two. Then, in sub-section (b), a critique of her conception of "good-enough deliberation" 45 enables me to specify which elements of justice should enjoy greater weighting than others.
(a) "the requirements of justice"
Up to this point, I have made the assumption that democracy and justice are two equally important goods joined in a completely circular relationship. This means that changes in democratic procedures can have unlimited effects on collective judgements about justice, and changes in such judgements can have unlimited consequences for democratic procedures. It is this assumption which makes virtuous circularity possible: fair democratic procedures can produce more just outcomes, and more just outcomes can produce fairer procedures, and so on (until the complete realization of democratic justice). At the same time, however, it is this assumption which also makes vicious circularity possible: unfair procedures can deepen injustice, and more injustice can lead to more unfair procedures, and so on (so that a state of undemocratic injustice can never be escaped).
Consequently, one way in which it might be possible to solve this problem would be to abandon the assumption that democracy and justice 22 stand in a fully circular relationship, and to assert instead that certain requirements of justice should act as independent constraints on democratic deliberation. Against the main thrust of her argument, there is one passage in Fraser"s work in which she appears to do just this. In the book co-written with Axel Honneth, she recommends a division of labour between "philosophers"
and "democratic citizens". While the task of philosophers is to delimit the set of political options which are "compatible with the requirements of justice", it must be left to citizens themselves to decide collectively between these options. 46 In other words, the role of philosophers is to engage in the conceptual analysis of parity of participation, in order to determine the range of laws, policies and institutions which comply with that standard. It is then for citizens to engage in democratic debate in order to make choices within this range. Thus citizens are always constrained by the principle of parity of participation: they cannot choose options incompatible with it, and they cannot choose the principle itself. In this passage, then, Fraser appears to argue that justice as participatory parity sets absolute limits on the choices that democratic deliberators can make. to by all". 48 What this means is that a norm of justice is legitimate only if all of those bound by it are able to regard themselves as its authors, and this means that it must be agreed to in a process of democratic deliberation. Thus justice as participatory parity should not serve as an independent constraint on democracy since it is only through deliberation that norms of justice acquire legitimacy. As Ian Shapiro puts it, "enterprises for social improvement" that fail to regard conceptions of democracy and justice as "individually satisfying and mutually reinforcing" cannot "garner political legitimacy in the medium term". 49 Rather than abandoning the idea of circularity by asserting the priority of (certain aspects of) justice over democracy, a better way forward is to abandon the assumption that these two goods are of equal weight, and to accept instead that in the relationship between the two justice should have a greater weighting than democracy. What I mean by this is that it should be more difficult to change the conditions necessary for fair and inclusive democratic deliberation than it is to change other conditions which are not necessary in this regard. This proposal could be institutionalized in a number of ways. For example, a degree of constitutional protection could be given to the norms of justice necessary to guarantee fair and inclusive deliberation so that those norms could only be changed by a super-majority of deliberators.
Other norms of justice, not essential to ensure such deliberation, would be subject to determination in ordinary processes of democratic deliberation. I 24 would argue that this proposal has two major strengths. First, since it imposes no absolute limits on the choices that deliberators can make, it stays true to the idea that justice and democracy are joined in a circular relationship.
This means that it does not become an instance of a monological account of justice in which a philosopher decides in isolation what norms of justice are necessary for fair and inclusive democratic deliberation. Second, since this proposal makes it difficult to change the conditions of such deliberation, the danger that a democratic public could choose norms of justice which undermine the fairness and inclusiveness of its own deliberations -so creating a vicious circle of undemocratic injustice -is diminished.
(b) "good enough deliberation"
In a second step beyond Fraser"s theory of democratic justice, I shall now finesse the proposal I have just made by seeking to identify those elements of justice which, since they are necessary to ensure fair and inclusive deliberation, should enjoy greater weighting than others. To bring this task into focus, I want to suggest that it presents us a dilemma. these terms, her claim is that, so long as the minimal standard of democratic justice is in place, then movement toward the maximal standard is possible.
To the best of my knowledge, Fraser has not attempted to identify these minimal standards in any detail. On the rival account of democratic justice which I am proposing here, this would be a vital task. Following
Fraser"s three dimensional account of justice, it would be necessary to identify the quantity of economic resources, degree of cultural standing, and level of political voice that would enable good enough deliberation to take place.
Although I do not have the space here to carry out this task, I can give some indication of what it might involve. With regard to economic resources, the minimal standard could take the form of a minimum wage, while the maximal standard could be a basic income set at a suitably high level. So far as cultural standing is concerned, the minimal standard could be the absence of disesteem that has a seriously adverse effect on the life-chances of particular sets of individuals. The maximal standard could be an institutionalized pattern of cultural values which ensures that all members of a political association are suitably acknowledged. In the case of political voice, the minimal standard could be what Shapiro describes as "the basic democratic institutions of popularly elected governments based on universal franchise", while the maximal standard could go beyond these basic institutions by adding, for instance, gender quotas and multicultural rights in order to ensure that all members of a political association have equal voice. In each case, while the appropriate minimal standard is that which ensures that good enough deliberation can take place, there will be a potentially infinite number of maximal standards which particular demoi could seek to realize at particular times.
Conclusion
In this article, I have sought to defend, at least in outline, an account of the relationship between democracy and justice in which these two political goods stand in a circular relationship to one another: just outcomes emerge from 
